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ABSTRACT
This paper examines alternative risk management strategies in terms of their effectiveness for
three representative Alberta farm operations.  Stochastic dynamic simulation methods are used
to model financial performance for these farms, and alternative risk management programs are
compared in terms of their ability to stabilize returns, support income and reduce the probability
of bankruptcy.  The results suggest that government programs such as the Net Income
Stabilization Account (NISA) program or the Farm Income Disaster Program (FIDP) in Alberta
have some benefits in terms of supporting income levels and reducing the chances of farm
failure.  Neither program is very effective, however, in stabilizing year to year income or cash
flow for the farm operations.  As a risk management program, FIDP is more effective than NISA
but this improved performance comes at the price of higher government costs.  Performance of
NISA and FIDP, relative to alternative risk management programs and strategies such as
forward contracting or crop insurance, is mixed.  In some cases, NISA does not seem to provide
benefits beyond those available from other strategies, while FIDP tends to perform better than
the alternatives.  Finally, while increased debt load weakens firm financial performance, NISA
and FIDP still provide some benefits in terms of supporting income and reducing the probability
of bankruptcy.
INTRODUCTION
Canadian agriculture has a long history of government involvement in programs designed to
stabilize prices and incomes.  These programs have come under renewed scrutiny due to the
combined effects of government budget constraints and international trade negotiations.  The
result has been a move from commodity specific and price based programs towards programs that
are intended to stabilize farm gross margin
1 or net income.  These are often referred to as safety
net programs.  This fundamental policy reform is consistent with shifts in attitudes concerning
government intervention in agriculture (Agriculture Canada 1989).
In Alberta, two public safety net programs currently available to agricultural producers are the
Net Income Stabilization Account (NISA) program and the Farm Income Disaster Program
(FIDP).  While the two programs differ in terms of the rules governing program “mechanics”,2
each is intended to stabilize producer returns.  There is currently little information on the potential
effectiveness of NISA or FIDP in stabilizing income or improving financial performance (e.g.,
wealth enhancement).
2  It is also unknown whether either of these programs is any more effective
than alternative risk management or stabilization strategies available to Alberta farmers.  Given
the importance of risk and risk management in agriculture, and the long term implications of
NISA and FIDP in terms of the potential cost to taxpayers, these are important issues.
The objectives of this paper are to a) evaluate NISA and FIDP in terms of their ability to stabilize
returns or otherwise improve financial performance over time for different types of farming
operations in Alberta; and b) compare the two programs to alternative risk management programs
and strategies currently available to Alberta farmers.  The “effectiveness” of any particular
program or strategy is evaluated on the basis of three criteria; the ability to stabilize returns over
time, the ability to improve financial performance, and the ability to reduce the risk of business
failure (i.e., bankruptcy).
These objectives are achieved through the use of dynamic stochastic simulation for representative
Alberta farm operations.  Participation in NISA and FIDP is evaluated, relative to non-
participation, using three criteria;  ending wealth levels, the ability to support and stabilize income
and cash flow over the relevant time horizon, and the probability of bankruptcy.  In addition,
alternative risk management strategies are modelled for the representative farms.  These
alternatives are evaluated using the same three criteria.
SAFETY NET PROGRAMS
The term safety net is used to describe public programs that are intended to support and/or
stabilize producer incomes.  NISA is an example of a safety net program.  Two other safety net
programs are also considered in this paper; the Farm Income Disaster Program (FIDP) and crop
insurance.  A brief description of these three programs is provided below.
Net Income Stabilization Account (NISA)
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The Net Income Stabilization Account (NISA) program is a voluntary program jointly
administered by the federal and provincial governments.  The objective of NISA is to provide a
mechanism by which participating agricultural producers may stabilize revenues over time.  As
currently structured, NISA is essentially a savings account.  Farmers make contributions in years
of high income and draw from their account in low income years, based on certain program
triggers.
Producers may contribute up to 20 percent of net sales into a program account each year.  Net
sales are total farm sales minus purchases of all agricultural products, and represent the net value
of agricultural production for the farm operation.  The federal and provincial governments match
farmer contributions up to a level of three percent of net sales.  Unused non-matching eligible
deposits may be carried forward by the farmer.  Interest is paid on the program account at a rate
consistent with market interest rates.  Farmer contributions earn a three percent bonus as well. 
There are dollar value limits placed on annual contributions and account balances.
NISA withdrawals are “triggered” by shortfalls in either of two performance measures.  If gross
margin for the farm falls below the five-year historical average, the farmer may withdraw an
amount up to the difference between the two values.  If net income for the farm falls below
$10,000, the farmer may withdraw an amount up to the difference between the two values.  Gross
margin is equal to net sales minus eligible expenses (i.e., most farm expenses excluding interest,
depreciation, lease or rental payments, and improvement costs).  Net income is equal to net sales
minus operating and fixed costs for the farm operation (i.e., before-tax profit).  The farmer may
withdraw the larger of the two amounts indicated by the triggers.  The withdrawal may not
exceed the NISA program account balance.
Farm Income Disaster Program (FIDP)
4
FIDP is a voluntary support program initiated and funded by the Alberta provincial government. 
The objective of FIDP is to lessen extreme income reductions occurring because of circumstances
that are beyond the control of the producer.  The mechanics of the program are relatively simple. 4
In any given year, an application for a program payment may be made if the producer’s program
margin is less than 70 percent of his/her average program margin for the previous three years. 
The payment is equal to the difference between these two values.  The program margin for FIDP
calculations is basically the same as gross margin for NISA; that is, net sales minus the same
eligible expenses.  If the program margin is negative, the payment will be equal to the 70 percent
of the three year historical average value; that is, there is no support for negative program
margins.  The program caps annual payments at $100,000 per individual or $500,000 per
corporation.  Finally, FIDP payments are reduced by the amount of any government contributions
to producers’ NISA accounts.
Crop Insurance
Crop insurance is a well-established risk management tool for crop producers.  Typically, crop
insurance is a voluntary program designed to provide some protection against yield risk for crop
producers.  In Alberta, crop insurance is jointly funded by participating producers (50 percent)
and the provincial (25 percent) and federal (25 percent) governments.  The producers’
contributions arise from premiums paid for insurance coverage.
Producers enrol in crop insurance by paying a per acre premium.  This premium varies by crop
and by risk area.  Crop insurance risk areas are determined by climate, soil type, etc.  The
insurance coverage received by the producer is equal to 70 percent of the long-term area yield for
the specific crop, adjusted by a factor that reflects the producer’s average yields relative to the
area average.  If the actual crop yield obtained by the producer is below the coverage level, a crop
insurance payment is generated.  The payment is equal to the yield shortfall (i.e., coverage level
minus actual yield) multiplied by the relevant crop price.
METHODOLOGY
The methodology used for this study consists of three parts; identification of representative farms,
simulation procedures, and risk management program analysis.  Representative firm analysis is
used to model the effectiveness of alternative risk management options and programs for Alberta5
farm operations.  Three representative farms are defined for this purpose; a beef feedlot, a
cropping operation and a farrow-to-finish hog operation.  The financial performance for each of
these farming operations, assuming different risk management scenarios, is modelled using
stochastic, dynamic simulation procedures.  The results from the simulation analysis are then
examined in order to evaluate the risk management options.  Each of these aspects is discussed in
more detail below.
Representative Farms
The three representative farms (i.e., beef, crop and hog) defined and used in the simulation
analysis are not intended to be “average” farms.  Instead, they are representative in that they could
be considered as being “typical” of many commercial farm operations in Alberta.  For each farm,
production and technical characteristics are developed using historical data.  These characteristics
include capital structure (i.e., dollar values for land, buildings, equipment, etc.), production levels
and patterns (e.g., crop acreage and yields), costs and returns for the different enterprises (e.g.,
feed costs, machinery expenses, output prices, crop yields), as well as marketing patterns.
The beef operation is a feedlot that markets 5000 head of cattle per year.  There are no crop
enterprises and all inputs are purchased including cattle and feed.  The feedlot operator utilizes
seasonal marketing, with one-half of the animals being marketed in June and July and the other
half being marketed in the period from November to January.  The asset base for this operation
(i.e., land, buildings and equipment) is approximately $950,000.  Data used to develop the
production and financial characteristics for this farm operation are obtained from Novak and
Viney (1995).
The cropping operation is a 1600 acre farm that is located near Trochu, Alberta.  The farm makes
use of conventional tillage systems, and has a crop rotation of wheat-barley-canola.  The asset
base for this operation (i.e., land, buildings and equipment) is approximately $1,285,000.  Data
used to develop the production and financial characteristics for this farm operation are obtained
from Bauer et al (1995).6
The hog farm is a farrow-to-finish operation with 350 sows.  The farm does not have any crop
enterprises and purchases all feed and breeding stock replacements.  The operation utilizes a
uniform marketing strategy, marketing 132 pigs per week.  The asset base for this operation (i.e.,
land, buildings, equipment and breeding stock) is approximately $1,200,000. Data used to
develop the production and financial characteristics for this farm operation are obtained from
Bresee (1997).
Rather than assume a particular debt level for the farms, the simulation analysis is carried out for
two alternative debt scenarios.  This provides an opportunity to examine the effects of debt level
(i.e., financial risk) on the effectiveness of alternative risk management strategies.  In each case,
the debt scenario is characterized by a particular debt-to-asset ratio (i.e., D/A).  Low debt is
represented by a D/A of 0.25 and high debt is represented by a D/A of 0.50.
5  The particular D/A
ratio is then multiplied by total assets for the farm to obtain the initial debt level.
Simulation Analysis
The representative farms are modelled using multi-period stochastic simulation.  Each
combination of representative farm, debt level and risk management option is simulated over a ten
year time horizon.  The simulation is stochastic in that 5000 iterations are used for each
combination.    Annual costs and returns are drawn from specified probability distributions, which
are based on historical data (same sources as for representative farm characteristics).  The only
exception for this is the crop farm for which crop yields and prices, rather than gross revenue, are
drawn from separate distributions.  This is done due to the necessity of being able to identify crop
yields for the purposes of modelling participation in crop insurance.
The simulation model itself is basically a set of accounting equations.  The model calculates
annual sales and expenses, debt servicing requirements, depreciation, etc.  It tracks income and
cash flow measures, and calculates ending financial position (i.e., ending wealth) on a year by year
basis.  The model also incorporates the possibility of financial failure, as the farm operation is
declared bankrupt if ending wealth becomes negative at any point in the simulation.  Finally,7
depending on the particular risk management scenario, the model includes calculations for
variables such as program margins, contributions/withdrawals for NISA accounts, FIDP
payments, crop insurance payouts, etc.  The model is programmed using GAUSS (Aptech
Systems Inc. 1996).
Risk Management Alternatives: Identification and Assessment
For each representative farm/debt level combination, alternative risk management options or
strategies are modelled.  The default scenario in each case is non-participation in any risk
management program or strategy, referred to as the BASE scenario.  Participation in the NISA
program is the NISA scenario.  It is assumed that producers make the maximum matchable NISA
contribution in each year (i.e., two percent of net sales), even if borrowing is necessary to obtain
the funds.
6  Participation in the provincial FIDP program is referred to as the FIDP scenario. 
Finally, a “combination scenario” is modelled for each farm, involving participation in both NISA
and FIDP.  This is referred to as the BOTH scenario.
An additional risk management strategy is modelled for the beef farm and the cropping operation. 
This is done to assess the performance of NISA and FIDP relative to alternative strategies
currently available to producers.  The particular alternative varies by farm, as discussed below. 
This is done for two reasons.  First, different types of farm operations have access to different
types of risk management strategies, depending on the particular enterprise.  Secondly, each of the
alternatives affects the farm-level distributions for returns in somewhat unique ways, making a
more interesting and complete comparison with NISA and FIDP.
For the beef farm, the alternative modelled is the use of selective forward contracting for the
cattle.  If the terms are favourable the producer will utilize forward contracting to reduce price
risk.  Details for this scenario are provided by Novak and Viney (1995).  The scenario, referred to
as CONTRACT, has the effect of reducing the mean and variability for the producer’s net sales.
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For the cropping operation, the alternative strategy is participation in crop insurance.  It is
assumed that the producer insures all acres of all three crops.  As discussed earlier, in return for
paying a per acre premium, the producer receives a certain yield guarantee (i.e., 70 percent of the
adjusted long-term area yield).  Within the simulation analysis this scenario, referred to as
INSURE, has the effect of truncating the yield distributions at the coverage level.
The alternative risk management strategies identified above are compared and evaluated in terms
of their “effectiveness”.  Three criteria are used to measure effectiveness.  First, the strategies are
assessed in terms of their ability to stabilize returns over time.  Stability refers to the ability to
reduce variability for a particular measure.  In this case, stability is measured in terms of income
and cash flow.  Average values and variability for net income and net cash flow are measured on
an annual basis.  From these, statistical confidence intervals are calculated and compared between
alternative strategies.
Effectiveness is also measured in terms of the ability to support income; that is, improve financial
performance.  The ability of a strategy to “support” income can be measured using net income. 
Alternatively, ending wealth also incorporates profit levels.  Higher net income levels result in
higher ending wealth levels.  Therefore, average ending wealth is used to compare strategies in
this respect.  Average ending wealth is the farm’s equity position after ten years, averaged over all
iterations.
8
Improved financial performance can also be measured in terms of liquidity; that is, the ability to
support cash flow.  Cash flow support is measured by the probability of illiquidity.  This
probability is calculated as the proportion of solvent years over the 5000 iterations that have a
negative net cash flow.  If one strategy supports cash flow to a greater extent, it might be
expected that the probability of illiquidity would be lower for that strategy.
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The third criterion is the ability to reduce the risk of business failure.  Each strategy is assessed
with respect to the probability of bankruptcy.  The probability of bankruptcy represents the
proportion of the 5000 iterations ending in bankruptcy, expressed as a percentage.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Tables 1, 2 and 3 provide a summary of the simulation results for the three representative farms
and the various risk management scenarios.  From these tables, some general trends are identified
and discussed below.
Effectiveness of NISA and FIDP versus Non-Participation (BASE)
One criterion used to evaluate the safety net programs is the degree to which they stabilize income
and net cash flows.  This may be done by examining the impact of NISA and FIDP on the
variability of these measures over time, relative to the BASE scenario.  If NISA and FIDP are
effective in stabilizing income and cash flow, it is expected that the degree of year-to-year
variability will be reduced.  For each farm and each risk management alternative, 95% confidence
intervals are calculated for net cash flow and net income.  These statistical confidence intervals
around average values over time are compared between the alternative scenarios.  If NISA and
FIDP are effective in stabilizing returns, the confidence intervals should be “narrower”; that is, the
year-to-year variability should be reduced.
For space reasons, not all confidence intervals are provided here.  However, Figures 1 and 2
provide the 95% statistical confidence intervals for the low debt version of the cropping
operation.  The patterns exhibited in these figures are consistent with those for the other
representative operations.  Therefore, they will be used to illustrate the effectiveness of the safety
net programs in terms of stabilization.
As shown in Figure 1, NISA and FIDP have little impact on the stability of net cash flow. 
Specifically, the “width” of the confidence intervals does not differ between the various risk10
management alternatives.  In contrast, Figure 2 suggests that NISA and FIDP have some
stabilizing effects on net income (i.e., the confidence interval around the average value is
reduced), although the impact is slight.
Much of the difference in the ability of the two programs to support and stabilize income versus
cash flow is due to the timing of withdrawals or payments from these programs.  Payments from
NISA or FIDP are received in the calendar year following the year in which the shortfall occurs,
due to the fact that the calculations are based on tax filer information.  While the accrual basis on
which net income is calculated results in FIDP payments, for example, being allocated to the
production year on which they are based, this is not the case with net cash flow.  Thus,
participation in the programs (particularly FIDP) does result in slightly improved income stability,
but not cash flow stability.
Another criterion used to evaluate NISA and FIDP is the degree to which they support income
and cash flows for the farms.  Average ending wealth provides an indication of this with respect to
income.  Given the method of asset valuation used in the simulation analysis (i.e., cost-based),
wealth only increases if the business generates positive profits.  As can be seen from the tabular
results, both NISA and FIDP result in increased wealth levels, suggesting that net income levels
are increased as well.  Depending on the farm and debt level, NISA provides an improvement of
between 7 and 94 percent, while the corresponding range of improvement attributable to FIDP is
24 to 105 percent.  This pattern is echoed in Figure 2, as the 95 percent confidence intervals for
net income associated with NISA and FIDP are consistently at a higher level than is the case for
the BASE scenario.
In assessing liquidity performance, the probability of illiquidity is used; that is, the proportion of
solvent years in which net cash flow is negative.  If net cash flows are supported and improved by
these programs, the probability of illiquidity should decrease.  This is true, to a certain extent. 
Participation in NISA or FIDP consistently results in a lower probability, although the11
improvement is not always significant.  It would seem, then, that the safety net programs are more
effective in supporting income than cash flows.
The ability of NISA and FIDP to support and improve financial performance for the
representative operations is primarily related to the subsidization aspects of each program.  If a
farmer participates in FIDP, payments represent a direct transfer from the provincial government
to the producer.  With participation in NISA, a farmer’s contributions are matched (to a degree)
by the federal and provincial governments.  There is also an interest bonus paid on farmer
contributions.  Thus, the ability of producers to draw on their NISA accounts is based not only on
their own contributions but also on a transfer of funds from governments.
The final criterion used in assessing the effectiveness of the safety net programs is the ability to
reduce the chances of business failure; that is, the probability of bankruptcy.  Both NISA and
FIDP reduce the probability of bankruptcy for the farms.  This is consistent across farms and debt
levels.  In many cases, the improvement is significant (i.e., between 19 and 76 percent reduction
for NISA, and between 59 and 100 percent reduction for FIDP).  As well, both NISA and FIDP
improve the average ending wealth levels for the farms and reduce the relative variability (i.e., the
coefficient of variation), when compared with the BASE scenario.  Thus, the safety net programs
are effective in reducing the chances of business failure.  Again, this improvement is largely
attributable to the direct transfer of funds from provincial and/or federal governments to the
farmers through the mechanics of the two programs.
A Comparison of NISA and FIDP
The two safety net programs may be compared to each other, using the same three criteria
discussed earlier.  If this is done, in general it may be said that FIDP is more effective than NISA. 
There is little difference in the “width” of the net income and net cash flow confidence intervals
(see Figures 1 and 2), suggesting that the two programs are similar in their ability (or lack thereof)
to stabilize returns over time.  However, the confidence intervals associated with FIDP are higher12
than those for NISA.  This suggests that FIDP is the superior program in terms of supporting
income.  This is confirmed through a comparison of average ending wealth levels for the two
programs.  FIDP consistently results in higher average ending wealth.  Finally, FIDP also results
in lower probabilities of bankruptcy, suggesting that it does a better job of improving the chances
of firm survival.  These trends are consistent across farms and debt levels.
The difference in performance may be largely attributed to the mechanics of the two programs.  In
order to be effective, NISA requires the farmer to contribute funds to the program account. 
Withdrawals are limited both by the triggers and by the account balance.  Assuming that the
farmer always makes the maximum matchable contribution, this contribution decision rule can
also actually exacerbate cash flow problems already existing within the farm operation.  In
contrast, FIDP requires no equivalent contributions as the program is completely funded by the
provincial government.
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The superior performance of FIDP comes at a cost.  As noted in Tables 1 to 3, the average annual
government contribution to FIDP (i.e., government payments) is greater than the corresponding
government “cost” for NISA (i.e., matching contributions to accounts plus bonus interest
payments).  In addition, as the relative degree of improvement for FIDP as compared to NISA
increases, so does the difference in government cost.  Evidence of this is provided by noting that
the superiority of FIDP over NISA is more pronounced for the beef and hog operations where,
correspondingly, the difference in annual government contributions between the two programs for
these farms is greater.
As noted in the discussion of methodology, a combination risk management scenario is modelled
for each farm.  This combines participation in both NISA and FIDP and is referred to as the
BOTH scenario in Tables 1 to 3.  As might be expected, the use of both NISA and FIDP
improves financial performance to an even greater extent relative to participation in either
program alone.  This is particularly true with respect to support for income (i.e., ending wealth
levels)and the probability of financial failure (i.e., probability of bankruptcy).  Variability of ending13
wealth is also reduced to a greater extent, when compared to the BASE scenario.  This suggests
that there is some degree of complementarity between the programs.  However, even the
combined programs do not provide significant benefits in terms of stabilizing income or cash
flows.  Once again, the improved performance comes at an increased government cost, relative to
participation in either of the programs in isolation.
NISA and FIDP versus Risk Management Alternatives
Two alternative risk management programs are modelled; selective contracting for the beef
operation (CONTRACT) and crop insurance for the cropping operation (INSURE).  The details
and impacts of these options are discussed earlier in the paper.
The performance of the alternative risk management strategies for the farms is mixed.  The
selective contracting (CONTRACT) strategy for the beef feedlot does not provide significant
benefits relative to the BASE scenario.  Average ending wealth levels are improved slightly,
relative to the BASE scenario.  Bankruptcy rates are reduced slightly, while the probability of
illiquidity actually increases relative to the BASE.  Relative to either NISA or FIDP, the
CONTRACT strategy does not perform well with respect to any of the three criteria.  Overall,
then, this particular risk management strategy provides poor protection relative to the public
safety net programs.
The crop insurance strategy (INSURE) for the cropping operation provides more significant
benefits and is somewhat effective in managing risk.  For example, from the results in Table 2 the
improvement in average ending wealth relative to the BASE scenario varies from 11 percent (low
debt) to 22 percent (high debt).  Probability of bankruptcy and illiquidity also improve relative to
the BASE.  If compared to NISA, crop insurance is as effective or more effective when
considering the various criteria outlined earlier.  This may be seen by comparing ending wealth,
and probabilities of bankruptcy and illiquidity.  In contrast, FIDP provides superior performance
when compared to crop insurance (INSURE).14
Consistent with the previous discussion, the differences in performance are attributable to
differences in the mechanics of the various programs.  While farmers are required to pay a
premium to gain access to insurance payouts (if warranted), there is no limit on payouts.  This is
in contrast to NISA, where again withdrawals are limited by producers’ account balances.  If
compared to FIDP, crop insurance does not perform as well at least in part because of the
difference in the risks being managed.  While FIDP is designed to limit exposure to gross margin
risk, crop insurance limits exposure to only yield risk.
Also consistent with previous discussion, the effectiveness of the programs is directly related to
the level of government cost.  As noted in Table 2, on an annual average basis crop insurance is
less costly than FIDP, but more costly than NISA.  This corresponds to the general relationship in
terms of their ability to manage risk.  Here, government contributions for crop insurance are
calculated as 50 percent of the average annual payout from the program to be consistent with the
government share of crop insurance premiums, and assuming actuarial soundness for the program.
Impact of Debt Levels
The results in Tables 1, 2 and 3 allow for an examination of the impact on the effectiveness of risk
management strategies of debt levels.  Not surprisingly, financial performance for any particular
scenario deteriorates with increased debt.  With an increased drain on cash flow and income due
to principal and interest payments on debt, average ending wealth for all farms decreases relative
to the low debt scenario.  In addition, the probabilities of bankruptcy and illiquidity for all farms
increase, in some cases significantly.
The impact of increased debt on the effectiveness of the risk management strategies is mixed.  The
relative improvement in the probability of bankruptcy attributable to participation in NISA or
FIDP decreases with increased debt levels.  For example, participation in NISA for the low debt
beef feedlot (Table 1) reduces the probability of bankruptcy by 55 percent (i.e., from 28.5 percent
to 12.8 percent).  For the same farm with high debt, the reduction attributable to NISA is only 4315
percent (i.e., from 48.7 percent to 27.8 percent).  This pattern is consistent for all farms and all
NISA/FIDP scenarios.  The same pattern also exists for the probability of illiquidity.
The effect of debt level on the relative improvement in ending wealth levels is also consistent
across programs.  In general, the ability of NISA or FIDP to improve ending wealth (i.e., support
income levels) is not adversely affected by debt levels.  For example, participation in NISA by the
low debt beef feedlot (Table 1) results in a 65 percent increase in average ending wealth (i.e.,
from $929,093 to $1,537,096).  For the same farm with high debt, the improvement is 94 percent
(i.e., from $521,524 to $1,012,283).  Similar patterns exist for the various representative farms,
for participation in FIDP.
This consistency is interesting, given the differences between NISA and FIDP  in program
objectives and mechanics.  FIDP is not intended to address variability in returns due to debt
servicing requirements.  As a result, the payment “trigger” is based on program margin
calculations which do not include interest costs.  In the case of NISA, there are two withdrawal
“triggers”, one of which is based on net income which includes debt servicing costs.  This allows
some support for producers with higher debt servicing costs.  However, the evidence suggests
that despite these differences, both programs are able to provide support regardless of debt level.
One other point may be made with respect to debt levels.  To a certain extent, program
participation (i.e., NISA, FIDP or BOTH scenarios) allows producers to increase debt levels
while maintaining a certain level of risk exposure.  Using the beef feedlot as an example (Table 1),
the probability of bankruptcy for the low debt farm and no risk management strategy is
approximately 29 percent.  If the debt level is increased to “high” (i.e., debt-to-asset ratio
increased from 0.25 to 0.50), participation in NISA results in the probability of bankruptcy being
virtually unchanged (i.e., approximately 28 percent).  This has implications for agricultural
producers who are considering expansion strategies where a significant amount of the financing
will come from debt sources.16
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The effectiveness of NISA as a risk management program is mixed.  The version of NISA
examined in this paper is somewhat effective in supporting net income for participating producers. 
It is also effective in reducing the chances of financial failure.  However, NISA is not very
effective in supporting or stabilizing cash flows for the farm operation, largely due to the time lag
between when shortfalls occur and when withdrawals are made available.  While increased debt
levels weaken performance both with and without participation in NISA, the ability of NISA to
improve performance and decrease the probability of bankruptcy is unchanged.
The FIDP program implemented by the provincial government in Alberta is more effective than
NISA in managing risk; that is, reducing the chances of financial failure and increased support for
income.  However, this effectiveness comes at a greater program cost to the government.  As
well, FIDP has the same shortcomings as NISA in terms of a lack of effectiveness in stabilization
of income and cash flow.  As is the case with NISA, FIDP is also able to maintain some risk
management benefits under higher debt levels, despite the fact that the program is not intended to
manage financial risk resulting from debt financing decisions.
If compared to alternative risk management strategies (e.g., selective contracting or crop
insurance), the performance of NISA is mixed.  It would appear that, to a certain extent,
agricultural producers already have access to risk management strategies that may provide the
same level of protection from risk.  However, it is also evident that NISA does provide some
advantages for certain groups of producers.  FIDP is clearly a superior program, from a
producer’s perspective, in terms of managing risk associated with revenue and gross margin, as
evidenced by the comparisons made for the beef feedlot operation (i.e., versus selective
contracting) and the cropping operation (i.e., versus crop insurance).
Overall, it may be concluded that both NISA and FIDP are somewhat effective programs, given
their objectives.  Both provide long terms stability to producers, largely due to a transfer of funds
from taxpayers.  Both programs are also somewhat effective relative to at least some of the risk17
management alternatives available to producers.  However, neither program provides much
stability in net income or net cash flow on a year-to-year basis.
One last point that may be made is that there is a significant public cost associated with both
NISA and FIDP.  This is particularly true for FIDP, where there are no farmer contributions
required as compared to NISA.  This is an important consideration, particularly when assessing
the comparisons made with other risk management options.  A question left unanswered by this
analysis is that of the optimal tradeoff between government (i.e., taxpayer) cost and risk
protection provided to producers.18
1. Gross margin refers to the margin between revenue and variable expenses.  For the
purposes of the safety net programs examined in this paper, the term program margin is
also used.
2. There has been some research conducted with respect to NISA, primarily relating to
agriculture in  Saskatchewan.  Spriggs and Taylor (1995) examine the effects of NISA on
Saskatchewan grain farms.  As well, Spriggs et al (1995) examine the aggregate effects of
NISA for the Saskatchewan agricultural sector.  Finally, Spriggs and Nelson (1997)
examine the impact of an enhanced NISA program in Saskatchewan.
3. Details concerning the structure and operation of NISA are provided by Agriculture and
Agri-Food Canada (1999).
4. The discussion of the mechanics for FIDP and crop insurance in Alberta is based on
information from Block (1996).
5. In this study, a third debt level is also considered, with an initial D/A of 0.75.  The
simulation results for this debt scenario are not reported here, but are available from the
authors upon request.
6. This represents one possible “decision rule” for NISA contribution decisions.  Other
decision rules are modelled in this study, including making contribution decisions based on
net cash flow or operating balance (i.e., chequing account balance) considerations.  The
simulation results based on these decision rules are not reported here but are available
from the authors.
7. A similar risk management strategy is also modelled for the hog operation.  The results
and relative effectiveness are similar to those for the selective contracting strategy for the
beef feedlot.  As a result, the results for the hog operation are not presented here.
8. Ending wealth for any iteration resulting in bankruptcy is set to zero.
9. The interpretation of this measure is limited by the use of an annual model; that is, an
important facet of liquidity is the availability of cash through the year as needed.  This
aspect, which is particularly significant for beef and hog operations that use uniform
marketing strategies, is ignored here.  However this measure does indicate, on an annual
basis, whether or not the farm operation was sufficiently liquid.
10. As noted earlier, the actual version of FIDP implemented in Alberta includes a cap on
annual payments for individual operations.  This cap would potentially affect “larger” farm
operations, and is not incorporated into this analysis.  However, the effective cap for a
specific operation depends on the ownership structure, and can vary from $100,000 to
$500,000.  Since no particular ownership structure is specified for any of these operations,
NOTES19
it is difficult to assess the potential impact of the annual payment cap.  The simulation
results for the representative farms suggest that, while the maximum single annual payout
from FIDP exceeds $100,000 for all farms, in no instance is it as great as $500,000. 20
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Table 1: Simulation Results for the Beef Feedlot
Risk Management Scenariob
Debt Scenario




- Average $929,093 $1,537,096 $1,594,968 $2,175,955 $941,731
- Standard Deviation $871,765 $995,492 $926,725 $921,757 $849,768
Prob. Of Bankruptcy 28.5% 12.8% 9.1% 3.5% 26.0%








- Average $521,524 $1,012,283 $1,069,425 $1,613,669 $524,666
- Standard Deviation $683,106 $879,718 $815,389 $860,106 $675,647
Prob. Of Bankruptcy 48.7% 27.8% 20.0% 8.7% 47.7%





a The two debt scenarios are based on initial debt levels, with low representing D/A=0.25
and high representing D/A=0.50.
b The various risk management scenarios are as defined in the main body of the paper.
c Statistics for ending wealth are based on all 5000 iterations, with bankruptcy being
represented by zero ending wealth.
d Government contributions for NISA include matching contributions and interest rate
bonus.  For FIDP, government contributions are the payments made to producers.22
Table 2: Simulation Results for the Cropping Operation
Risk Management Scenariob
Debt Scenario




- Average $1,321,274 $1,408,794 $1,642,092 $1,689,695 $1,464,993
- Standard Deviation $504,827 $517,173 $475,820 $465,556 $431,013
Prob. Of Bankruptcy 0.4% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%








- Average $513,859 $591,987 $810,192 $856,767 $628,085
- Standard Deviation $453,474 $480,435 $478,042 $472,197 $429,250
Prob. Of Bankruptcy 20.0% 16.2% 5.5% 3.9% 9.2%




$5,280 $17,872 $21,520 $7,010
a The two debt scenarios are based on initial debt levels, with low representing D/A=0.25
and high representing D/A=0.50.
b The various risk management scenarios are as defined in the main body of the paper.
c Statistics for ending wealth are based on all 5000 iterations, with bankruptcy being
represented by zero ending wealth.
d Government contributions for NISA include matching contributions and interest rate
bonus.  For FIDP, government contributions are the payments made to producers. 
Government contributions for crop insurance (INSURE) are equal to one-half of crop
insurance payouts to farmers.  The rationale for using this measure is discussed in the main
body of the paper.23
Table 3: Simulation Results for the Hog Farm
Risk Management Scenariob
Debt Scenario




- Average $1,473,832 $1,895,600 $2,054,010 $2,236,538
- Standard Deviation $719,276 $735,844 $702,174 $703,414
Prob. Of Bankruptcy 2.1% 0.5% 0.2% 0.0%








- Average $754,381 $1,138,758 $1,300,495 $1,480,533
- Standard Deviation $639,858 $713,644 $694,648 $700,775
Prob. Of Bankruptcy 19.8% 8.3% 4.7% 2.3%





a The two debt scenarios are based on initial debt levels, with low representing D/A=0.25
and high representing D/A=0.50.
b The various risk management scenarios are as defined in the main body of the paper.
c Statistics for ending wealth are based on all 5000 iterations, with bankruptcy being
represented by zero ending wealth.
d Government contributions for NISA include matching contributions and interest rate


























































































Figure 2 95% Confidence Intervals for Net Income, by Program:   Cropping Operation - Low Debt26